AMNA NAWAZ: For more on the# U.S.

negotiations with Iran,## we turn now to Ernest Moniz.

Trained as# a nuclear physicist, he was secretary of## energy during the Obama administration and# was a chief architect and the lead technical## negotiator of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement# known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,## or JCPOA.

He's now chief executive officer of# EFI Foundation, which focuses on energy policy.

Secretary Moniz, welcome back to the# "News Hour."

Thanks for joining us.

ERNEST MONIZ, Former U.S.

Energy Secretary:# Good to be back.

Thank you, Amna.

AMNA NAWAZ: So I want to start with your# reaction to this back-and-forth on the## issue of nuclear inspectors.

Yesterday, Vice# President Vance said Iran had agreed to allow## access to the IAEA to nuclear sites.# Today, Iranian officials are saying## that is just not true.

What do you make of# Vance's statement and the Iranian response?

ERNEST MONIZ: Well, first of all, the# issue could not be more important, frankly.

Frankly, since 2015 to this day, we have# always said that the most important part## of the nuclear dimensions of the JCPOA were in# fact the extraordinary verification measures,## and those hinge entirely upon# access by the IAEA inspectors.

So, when the vice president says that# the inspectors can come back into Iran,## that's not so special, nor is it special that# they have access to the Iranian declared nuclear## sites.

That's important.

But even more# important, which the JCPOA did have in it,## is that the inspectors could go to places# that Iran had not declared as nuclear sites,## but that the inspectors had reason to# believe may have had nuclear activity.

So it's the covert -- the# covert sites.

And, furthermore,## it's -- we're a long way from that# stage, obviously, given the exchange## that you referred to.

But, furthermore,# I believe that this negotiation has to at## least replicate what came out in 2015, namely,# that Iran agrees to the additional protocol.

That means that the inspectors can go to# sites that have not been declared by Iran,## but, furthermore, that there is# a finite time window for granting## that the access.

It was 24 days in 2015.# No other country has such a restriction.

It is absolutely critical that the inspectors# have access to potential covert sites and to have## access to them quickly enough to prevent major# cleanups of those sites before they inspect.

AMNA NAWAZ: So, to match the verification that# was in place for the previous nuclear deal,## they would have to guarantee access to even those## non-declared covert nuclear# sites, is what you're saying.

Also, on the issue of the highly enriched# uranium, the essential ingredient for a## nuclear weapon here, there was specific language# in the memorandum of understanding that was signed## that said the two nations had agreed to resolve# the disposition of stockpiled enriched material.

How can that be done?

What# would you expect to see when## the technical negotiations continue on this issue?

ERNEST MONIZ: There's two distinct issues here.

One is that, first of all, Iran, in# contrast to the situation in 2015,## had over the last few years enriched# uranium to a very high level, the 60## percent.

To give you a scale, 90 percent# enrichment is considered weapons-grade.

But I caution that you don't need weapons-grade# uranium to make a bomb; 60 percent uranium -- 60## percent enriched uranium is in fact quite adequate# to make a bomb.

You need a bit more material## than you would with 90 percent.

That's why the 60# percent enriched uranium is so sensitive, it's so## critical, because that material actually was the# last piece that Iran historically did not have in## its possession in order to make a bomb if it chose# to do so, which I don't believe they have, OK?

But resolving that issue is the absolute, in# my view, first order of business with regard## to enriched uranium.

Where is it?

What condition# is it in?

What is the risk.

Get rid of the risk,## probably by having the IAEA inspectors oversee# dilution of that material back to a very,## very low enrichment, which# would not present a danger.

AMNA NAWAZ: As you well know, these talks# are now being led by Vice President Vance,## Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared# Kushner.

There are, of course,## technical teams involved in the# details of these negotiations.

But you have sat across the table from the# Iranians.

You know what it is to negotiate in## the nitty-gritty.

Are you confident that the right# people are negotiating for the American side to## see through these verification measures that you# say are necessary to at least match the JCPOA?

ERNEST MONIZ: Well, I think the# question, of course, is how they use## the technical people, who they will# need to answer various questions.

I mean, those people exist,## for example, in the Department of Energy National# Laboratories.

In 2015, when I was negotiating,## we used the National Laboratory scientists# very, very heavily.

To be perfectly honest,## we used the time difference between Switzerland# and California very effectively in order to be## able to have those scientists carry# out all the analyses that we wanted.

Now, the place -- so that's a question of the## negotiators being skillful not# only in negotiating with Iran,## but skillful in using the technical assets that# are available to the United States government.

Now, the advantage I did have, being,## of course, trained as a physicist, was that# I knew which questions to ask.

And that was## a much more efficient way of carrying forward# the negotiation, perhaps a more effective way.

AMNA NAWAZ: There is this 60-day timeline they# have set, with the possible extension if needed.

But how confident are you that a detailed# agreement can be reached within those 60 days?

ERNEST MONIZ: Well, I have to be very skeptical# that a detailed agreement can be reached in## that time.

And, of course, one can ask, how# important is it to have a detailed agreement?

My answer to that would be, it's very# important, specifically because ambiguity## is something that can be manipulated, skirted by# the Iranians in particular.

And that's why the## agreement in 2015 was over 150 pages' long.# Sure, we had the same assurances up front## that the MOU has, namely that Iran committed to# never acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon.

But our mantra was, OK, fine, but we don't trust,# and verify.

So that's why the verification was## so important.

And that's why the don't# trust was reflected in the fact that we## followed every rabbit hole, basically, to block# ambiguities that could lead to the development## of a weapon or at least to approach# the threshold of having a weapon.

And I believe that that is an essential# element, and I do not see how that could## be done in 60 days unless a lot of groundwork# has already been done, which I'm not aware of.

AMNA NAWAZ: That is former U.S.

Secretary# of Energy Ernest Moniz joining us tonight.

Secretary Moniz, thank you so much# for your time.

Really appreciate it.

ERNEST MONIZ: Thank you, Amna.